Agence centrale de renseignement
 Sceau de la Central Intelligence Agency | |
 Drapeau de la Central Intelligence Agency | |
 Siège de la CIA, Langley, Virginie | |
| Présentation de l'agence | |
|---|---|
| Formé | 18 septembre 1947 |
| Agence précédente | |
| Taper | Indépendant (composante de la communauté du renseignement ) |
| Quartier général | George Bush Center for Intelligence Langley, Virginie , États-Unis 38°57′07″N 77°08′46″W / 38.95194°N 77.14611°WCoordonnées : 38°57′07″N 77°08′46″W / 38.95194°N 77.14611°W |
| Devise | "Le travail d'une nation. Le centre d'intelligence." Devise officieuse : "Et vous connaîtrez la vérité et la vérité vous rendra libre ." ( Jean 8:32 ) [2] |
| Des employés | 21575 (estimation) [3] |
| Budget annuel | 15 milliards de dollars (en 2013 [update]) [3] [4] [5] |
| Dirigeants d'agence |
|
| Site Internet | www |
L' Agence centrale de renseignement ( CIA ; / ˌ s Ï . Aɪ eɪ / ), connu officieusement comme l' Agence et la Société , [6] [7] est un civil service de renseignement étranger du gouvernement fédéral des États-Unis , officiellement pour tâche avec la collecte, le traitement et l'analyse des informations de sécurité nationale du monde entier, principalement grâce à l'utilisation du renseignement humain (HUMINT). En tant que membre principal de la communauté du renseignement des États-Unis(IC), la CIA rend compte au directeur du renseignement national et se concentre principalement sur la fourniture de renseignements au président et au Cabinet des États-Unis .
Contrairement au Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), qui est un service de sécurité nationale, la CIA n'a aucune fonction d'application de la loi et se concentre officiellement principalement sur la collecte de renseignements à l'étranger, avec seulement une collecte de renseignements nationaux limitée . [8] La CIA sert de gestionnaire national pour la coordination des activités HUMINT à travers la communauté du renseignement américain. C'est le seul organisme autorisé par la loi à mener et à superviser des actions secrètes à la demande du président . [8] [9] [10] [11] Il exerce une influence politique étrangère à travers ses divisions tactiques, telles que le Centre d'activités spéciales . [12]La CIA a également joué un rôle déterminant dans l'établissement de services de renseignement dans plusieurs pays alliés des États-Unis, comme le BND allemand . Il a également apporté son soutien à de nombreux groupes politiques et gouvernements étrangers, notamment en matière de planification, de coordination, de formation sur la torture, d'assistance technique, et a été impliqué dans plusieurs changements de régime , attentats terroristes et assassinats planifiés de dirigeants étrangers. [13] [3]
Depuis 2004, la CIA est organisée sous l'égide de l'Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). Malgré le transfert de certains de ses pouvoirs au DNI, la CIA s'est agrandie en réponse aux attentats du 11 septembre . En 2013, le Washington Post a rapporté qu'au cours de l'exercice 2010, la CIA disposait du budget le plus important de toutes les agences IC, dépassant les estimations précédentes. [3] [14]
La CIA a de plus en plus étendu son rôle, y compris les opérations paramilitaires secrètes . [3] L'une de ses plus grandes divisions, l'Information Operations Center (IOC), a officiellement déplacé son attention de la lutte contre le terrorisme vers les cyber-opérations offensives . [15]
L'agence a fait l'objet de nombreuses controverses , notamment de violations des droits de l'homme , d'écoutes téléphoniques et de propagande nationales , et d' allégations de trafic de drogue . Il est également apparu dans des œuvres de fiction , notamment des livres, des films et des jeux vidéo.
But
Lorsque la CIA a été créée, son objectif était de créer un centre d'échange d'informations et d'analyses sur la politique étrangère. Aujourd'hui, son objectif principal est de collecter, d'analyser, d'évaluer et de diffuser des renseignements étrangers et de mener des opérations secrètes.
Selon son budget pour l' exercice 2013, la CIA a cinq priorités: [3]
- Le contre - terrorisme , la priorité absolue
- Non - prolifération des armes nucléaires et autres armes de destruction massive .
- Avertir/informer les dirigeants américains d'événements importants à l'étranger.
- Contre-espionnage
- Cyber-intelligence .
Structure organisationnelle
La CIA a un bureau exécutif et cinq directions principales :
- La Direction de l'Innovation Numérique
- La Direction de l'Analyse
- La Direction des Opérations
- La Direction de l'Appui
- La Direction de la science et de la technologie
Bureau exécutif
Le directeur de la Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA) est nommé par le président avec confirmation du Sénat et relève directement du directeur du renseignement national (DNI) ; en pratique, le directeur de la CIA s'interface avec le directeur du renseignement national (DNI), le Congrès et la Maison Blanche , tandis que le directeur adjoint (DD/CIA) est l'exécutif interne de la CIA et le Chief Operating Officer (COO/CIA) , connu comme directeur exécutif jusqu'en 2017, dirige le travail quotidien [16] en tant que troisième poste le plus élevé de la CIA. [17] Le directeur adjoint est officiellement nommé par le directeur sans confirmation du Sénat, [17][18] mais comme l'opinion du président joue un grand rôle dans la décision, [18] le directeur adjoint est généralement considéré comme un poste politique, faisant du directeur des opérations le poste apolitique le plus élevé pour les officiers de carrière de la CIA. [19]
Le bureau exécutif soutient également l' armée américaine en lui fournissant les informations qu'elle recueille, en recevant des informations des organisations de renseignement militaire et en coopérant avec les activités sur le terrain. Le directeur général est responsable du fonctionnement quotidien de l'ICA. Chaque branche du service militaire a son propre directeur. [20] Le directeur adjoint des affaires militaires, un officier supérieur de l'armée, gère les relations entre la CIA et les commandements unifiés de combat , qui produisent et fournissent à la CIA des renseignements régionaux/opérationnels et consomment des renseignements nationaux produits par la CIA. [21] [22]
Direction de l'Analyse
La Direction de l'analyse , à travers une grande partie de son histoire connue sous le nom de Direction du renseignement (DI), est chargée d'aider « le président et les autres décideurs politiques à prendre des décisions éclairées concernant la sécurité nationale de notre pays » en examinant « toutes les informations disponibles sur une question. et l'organiser pour les décideurs ». [23] La Direction compte quatre groupes analytiques régionaux, six groupes pour les questions transnationales et trois qui se concentrent sur les politiques, la collecte et le soutien du personnel. [24] Il existe un bureau dédié à l' Irak ; bureaux d'analyse régionaux couvrant le Proche-Orient et l'Asie du Sud, la Russie et l'Europe ; et les bureaux d'Asie-Pacifique, d'Amérique latine et d'Afrique.
Direction des opérations
La Direction des opérations est responsable de la collecte de renseignements étrangers (principalement de sources HUMINT clandestines) et des actions secrètes. Le nom reflète son rôle de coordinateur des activités de renseignement humain entre d'autres éléments de la communauté du renseignement américain au sens large avec leurs opérations HUMINT. Cette direction a été créée pour tenter de mettre fin à des années de rivalité d'influence, de philosophie et de budget entre le département américain de la Défense (DOD) et la CIA. Malgré cela, le ministère de la Défense a récemment organisé son propre service mondial de renseignement clandestin, le Defense Clandestine Service (DCS), [25] sous la direction de la Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
Cette Direction est connue pour être organisée par régions géographiques et par enjeux, mais son organisation précise est classée. [26]
Direction de la science et de la technologie
La Direction de la science et de la technologie a été créée pour rechercher, créer et gérer des disciplines et des équipements de collection technique. Bon nombre de ses innovations ont été transférées à d'autres organisations de renseignement ou, à mesure qu'elles devenaient plus manifestes, aux services militaires.
Par exemple, le développement de l' avion de reconnaissance à haute altitude U-2 a été réalisé en coopération avec l' US Air Force . La mission originale de l'U-2 était le renseignement d'images clandestines sur des zones interdites telles que l' Union soviétique . [27] Il a par la suite été doté de capacités de renseignement sur les transmissions et de mesure et de renseignement sur les signatures , et est maintenant exploité par l'armée de l'air.
Une organisation DS&T a analysé les renseignements d'imagerie collectés par les satellites U-2 et de reconnaissance appelés le National Photointerpretation Center (NPIC), qui comptait des analystes de la CIA et des services militaires. Par la suite, le NPIC a été transféré à la National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). [ citation nécessaire ]
Direction de l'Appui
La Direction du soutien a des fonctions organisationnelles et administratives auprès d'unités importantes, notamment :
- Le bureau de la sécurité
- Le bureau de la communication
- Le Bureau des technologies de l'information
Direction de l'Innovation Numérique
La Direction de l'innovation numérique (DDI) se concentre sur l'accélération de l'innovation dans l'ensemble des activités de la mission de l'Agence. Il s'agit de la nouvelle direction de l'Agence. La mission du bureau de Langley, en Virginie , est de rationaliser et d'intégrer les capacités numériques et de cybersécurité dans les opérations d'espionnage, de contre-espionnage, d'analyse toutes sources, de collecte de renseignements open source et d'action secrète de la CIA. [28] Il fournit au personnel des opérations des outils et des techniques à utiliser dans les cyberopérations. Il travaille avec l' infrastructure des technologies de l'information et pratique le cybercommerce . [29] Cela signifie moderniser la CIA pour la cyberguerre. Les agents de la DDI aident à accélérer l'intégration de méthodes et d'outils innovants pour améliorer les capacités cyber et numériques de la CIA à l'échelle mondiale et, en fin de compte, aider à protéger les États-Unis. Ils appliquent également une expertise technique pour exploiter des informations clandestines et accessibles au public (également appelées données open source ) en utilisant des méthodologies spécialisées et des outils numériques pour planifier, initier et soutenir les opérations techniques et humaines de la CIA. [30] Avant la création de la nouvelle direction numérique, des cyberopérations offensives étaient entreprises par le Centre des opérations d'information de la CIA. [31] On sait peu de choses sur la façon dont le bureau fonctionne spécifiquement ou s'il déploie des cyber-capacités offensives. [28]
La direction fonctionnait secrètement depuis environ mars 2015, mais a officiellement commencé ses activités le 1er octobre 2015. [32] Selon des documents budgétaires classifiés, le budget d'exploitation du réseau informatique de la CIA pour l'exercice 2013 était de 685,4 millions de dollars. Le budget de la NSA était d'environ 1 milliard de dollars à l'époque. [33]
Le représentant Adam Schiff , le démocrate californien qui est le membre le plus important du House Intelligence Committee , a approuvé la réorganisation. « Le directeur a mis ses employés, le reste de la communauté du renseignement et la nation au défi de réfléchir à la manière dont nous menons les affaires du renseignement dans un monde profondément différent de celui de 1947, année de la fondation de la CIA », a déclaré Schiff. [34]
Entraînement
La CIA a créé son premier centre de formation, le Bureau de la formation et de l'éducation, en 1950. Après la fin de la guerre froide , le budget de formation de la CIA a été réduit, ce qui a eu un effet négatif sur la rétention des employés . [35] [36] En réponse, le directeur du renseignement central George Tenet a créé l'Université de la CIA en 2002. [35] [23] L' Université de la CIA organise entre 200 et 300 cours chaque année, formant à la fois les nouvelles recrues et les agents de renseignement expérimentés, ainsi que des Personnel de soutien de la CIA. [35] [36] L'installation travaille en partenariat avec la National Intelligence University et comprend leSherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis , la composante de la Direction de l'analyse de l'université. [23] [37] [38]
Pour la formation ultérieure des élèves officiers des opérations, il existe au moins une zone d'entraînement classée au Camp Peary , près de Williamsburg, en Virginie . Les étudiants sont sélectionnés et leurs progrès évalués, de manière dérivée de l'OSS, publié sous le titre Assessment of Men, Selection of Personnel for the Office of Strategic Services . [39] Une formation supplémentaire à la mission est menée à Harvey Point , en Caroline du Nord . [40]
Le centre de formation principal du Bureau des communications est le Warrenton Training Center , situé près de Warrenton, en Virginie . L'installation a été créée en 1951 et est utilisée par la CIA depuis au moins 1955. [41] [42]
Budget
Les détails du budget global du renseignement des États-Unis sont classifiés. [3] En vertu de la Loi sur la Central Intelligence Agency de 1949, le directeur de la Central Intelligence est le seul employé du gouvernement fédéral qui peut dépenser de l' argent du gouvernement « sans justificatif » . [43] Le gouvernement a montré que son budget 1997 était de 26,6 milliards de dollars pour l'année fiscale. [44] Le gouvernement a divulgué un chiffre total pour toutes les dépenses de renseignement non militaires depuis 2007 ; le chiffre de l'exercice 2013 est de 52,6 milliards de dollars. Selon les divulgations de la surveillance de masse de 2013 , le budget de l'exercice 2013 de la CIA est de 14,7 milliards de dollars, 28 % du total et près de 50 % de plus que le budget de la National Security Agency. HUMINT de la CIAle budget est de 2,3 milliards de dollars, le budget SIGINT est de 1,7 milliard de dollars et les dépenses pour la sécurité et la logistique des missions de la CIA sont de 2,5 milliards de dollars. Les « programmes d'action secrète », y compris une variété d'activités telles que la flotte de drones de la CIA et les activités du programme nucléaire anti- iranien , représentent 2,6 milliards de dollars. [3]
Il y a eu de nombreuses tentatives antérieures pour obtenir des informations générales sur le budget. [45] En conséquence, des rapports ont révélé que le budget annuel de la CIA pour l'exercice 1963 était de 550 millions de dollars (ajusté en fonction de l'inflation de 4,6 milliards de dollars en 2021), [46] et le budget global du renseignement pour l'exercice 1997 était de 26,6 milliards de dollars (inflation- 42,9 milliards de dollars US ajustés en 2021). [47] Il y a eu des divulgations accidentelles; par exemple, Mary Margaret Graham , ancienne responsable de la CIA et directrice adjointe du renseignement national pour la collecte en 2005, a déclaré que le budget annuel du renseignement était de 44 milliards de dollars [48]et en 1994, le Congrès a accidentellement publié un budget de 43,4 milliards de dollars (en dollars de 2012) en 1994 pour le Programme national de renseignement non militaire, dont 4,8 milliards de dollars pour la CIA. [3]
Après l' approbation du plan Marshall , qui a affecté 13,7 milliards de dollars sur cinq ans, 5 % de ces fonds, soit 685 millions de dollars, ont été secrètement mis à la disposition de la CIA. Une partie de l'énorme M-fund, créé par le gouvernement américain pendant la période d'après-guerre pour la reconstruction du Japon, a été secrètement dirigée vers la CIA. [49]
Des employés
Polygraphier
Robert Baer , un analyste de CNN et ancien agent de la CIA, a déclaré que normalement un employé de la CIA subit un examen polygraphique tous les trois ou quatre ans. [50]
Relation avec d'autres agences de renseignement
| Fait partie d' une série sur |
| Surveillance mondiale |
|---|
 |
| Divulgations |
| Systèmes |
| Agences |
| Personnes |
| Des endroits |
| Lois |
| Changements proposés |
| notions |
| Rubriques connexes |
La CIA agit en tant que principal organisme américain HUMINT et d'analyse générale, sous la direction du directeur du renseignement national , qui dirige ou coordonne les 16 organisations membres de la communauté du renseignement des États-Unis . En outre, il obtient des informations d'autres agences de renseignement du gouvernement américain, de sources d'informations commerciales et de services de renseignement étrangers. [ citation nécessaire ]
agences américaines
Les employés de la CIA font partie des effectifs du National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), créé en tant que bureau conjoint de la CIA et de l' US Air Force pour exploiter les satellites espions de l'armée américaine.
Le Special Collections Service est un bureau conjoint de la CIA et de la National Security Agency (NSA) qui effectue une surveillance électronique clandestine dans les ambassades et les territoires hostiles du monde entier.
Services de renseignement étrangers
Le rôle et les fonctions de la CIA sont à peu près équivalents à ceux du Federal Intelligence Service (BND) allemand, du Secret Intelligence Service du Royaume-Uni (le SIS ou MI6), de l' Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), du service de renseignement extérieur français Direction générale de la Sécurité extérieure (DGSE), le Service russe de renseignement extérieur ( Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki , SVR), le ministère chinois de la Sécurité d'État (MSS), l'Indian Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), le Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) , le service égyptien des renseignements généraux, Israel's Mossad, and South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS). While the preceding agencies both collect and analyze information, some like the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research are purely analytical agencies.[citation needed]
The CIA was instrumental in the establishment of intelligence services in several U.S. allied countries, including Germany's BND.
Les liens les plus étroits de l'US IC avec d'autres agences de renseignement étrangères sont vers les pays anglophones : l'Australie, le Canada, la Nouvelle-Zélande et le Royaume-Uni. Des communications spéciales signalent que les messages liés au renseignement peuvent être partagés avec ces quatre pays. [51] Une indication de la coopération opérationnelle étroite des États-Unis est la création d'une nouvelle étiquette de distribution de messages au sein du principal réseau de communication militaire américain. Auparavant, le marquage de NOFORN (c'est-à-dire aucun ressortissant étranger) exigeait que l'auteur précise quels pays non américains, le cas échéant, pouvaient recevoir les informations. Une nouvelle mise en garde concernant la manipulation, USA/AUS/CAN/GBR/NZL Five Eyes, utilisé principalement sur les messages de renseignement, permet d'indiquer plus facilement que le matériel peut être partagé avec l'Australie, le Canada, le Royaume-Uni et la Nouvelle-Zélande.
La tâche de la division appelée " Verbindungsstelle 61 " du Bundesnachrichtendienst allemand est de garder le contact avec le bureau de la CIA à Wiesbaden . [52] La Direction irlandaise du renseignement militaire assure la liaison avec la CIA, bien qu'elle ne soit pas membre des Five Eyes . [53]
Histoire
L'Agence centrale de renseignement a été créé le 26 Juillet 1947, quand Harry S. Truman a signé la Loi sur la sécurité nationale en droit. Une impulsion majeure pour la création de l'agence a été les tensions croissantes avec l'URSS après la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale . [54]
Prédécesseurs immédiats
Le succès des commandos britanniques pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale a incité le président américain Franklin D. Roosevelt à autoriser la création d'un service de renseignement sur le modèle du British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) et du Special Operations Executive . Cela a conduit à la création de l' Office of Strategic Services (OSS) établi par un ordre militaire présidentiel émis par le président Roosevelt le 13 juin 1942. Le 20 septembre 1945, peu après la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, Harry S. Truman a signé un décret dissolving the OSS, and by October 1945 its functions had been divided between the Departments of State and War. The division lasted only a few months. The first public mention of the "Central Intelligence Agency" appeared on a command-restructuring proposal presented by Jim Forrestal and Arthur Radford to the U.S. Senate Military Affairs Committee at the end of 1945.[55] Army Intelligence agent Colonel Sidney Mashbir and Commander Ellis M. Zacharias worked together for four months at the direction of Fleet Admiral Joseph Ernest King, et a préparé le premier projet et les directives de mise en œuvre pour la création de ce qui allait devenir la Central Intelligence Agency. [56] [57] [58] Malgré l'opposition de l'establishment militaire, le Département d'État des États-Unis et le Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), [59] Truman a créé la National Intelligence Authority [60] en janvier 1946. Son fonctionnement l'extension était connue sous le nom de Central Intelligence Group (CIG), [61] qui était le prédécesseur direct de la CIA. [62]
Loi sur la sécurité nationale
Lawrence Houston, head counsel of the SSU, CIG, and, later CIA, was principal draftsman of the National Security Act of 1947,[63][64][65] which dissolved the NIA and the CIG, and established both the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency.[61][66] In 1949 Houston helped to draft the Central Intelligence Agency Act (Pub.L. 81–110), qui autorisait l'agence à utiliser des procédures fiscales et administratives confidentielles, et l'exemptait de la plupart des limitations sur l'utilisation des fonds fédéraux. Il a également exempté la CIA d'avoir à divulguer son « organisation, ses fonctions, ses fonctionnaires, ses titres, ses salaires ou le nombre de personnes employées ». Il a créé le programme "PL-110" pour gérer les transfuges et autres "étrangers essentiels" qui ne relevaient pas des procédures d'immigration normales. [67] [68]
Intelligence contre action
Au début de la guerre de Corée, la CIA ne comptait encore que quelques milliers d'employés, dont un millier environ travaillaient dans l'analyse. Les renseignements provenaient principalement du Bureau des rapports et des estimations, qui tirait ses rapports d'une prise quotidienne de télégrammes du Département d'État, de dépêches militaires et d'autres documents publics. La CIA n'avait toujours pas ses capacités de collecte de renseignements. [69] Le 21 août 1950, peu de temps après, Truman a annoncé que Walter Bedell Smith était le nouveau directeur de la CIA. Le changement de direction a eu lieu peu de temps après l' invasion de la Corée du Sud, car l'absence d'avertissement clair au président et au Conseil de sécurité nationale concernant l'invasion imminente de la Corée du Nord a été considérée comme un grave échec des services de renseignement. [ clarification nécessaire ] [69]
La CIA était soumise à différentes exigences par les divers organes qui la supervisent. Truman voulait un groupe centralisé pour organiser les informations qui lui parvenaient, [70] [71] le ministère de la Défense voulait des renseignements militaires et des actions secrètes, et le département d'État voulait créer un changement politique global favorable aux États-Unis. Ainsi, les deux domaines de responsabilité de la CIA étaient l'action secrète et le renseignement secret. L'une des principales cibles de la collecte de renseignements était l' Union soviétique , qui avait également été une priorité des prédécesseurs de la CIA. [70] [71] [72]
Le général de l'armée de l'air américaine Hoyt Vandenberg , deuxième directeur du CIG, a créé l'Office of Special Operations (OSO), ainsi que l'Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE). [71] Initialement, l'OSO a été chargé d'espionnage et de subversion à l'étranger avec un budget de 15 millions de dollars, la largesse d'un petit nombre de mécènes au Congrès. Les objectifs de Vandenberg ressemblaient beaucoup à ceux fixés par son prédécesseur ; découvrir "tout sur les forces soviétiques en Europe orientale et centrale - leurs mouvements, leurs capacités et leurs intentions". [73]
Le 18 juin 1948, le Conseil national de sécurité a publié la directive 10/2 [74] appelant à une action secrète contre l'URSS, [75] et accordant le pouvoir de mener des opérations secrètes contre des « états ou groupes étrangers hostiles » qui pourraient, si nécessaire, être refusé par le gouvernement américain. À cette fin, le Bureau de la coordination des politiques (OPC) a été créé au sein de la nouvelle CIA. L'OPC était unique; Frank Wisner , le chef de l'OPC, ne répondait pas au directeur de la CIA , mais aux secrétaires de la défense, de l'État, et les actions du NSC et de l'OPC étaient un secret même pour le chef de la CIA. La plupart des stations de la CIA avaient deux chefs de station, l'un travaillant pour l'OSO et l'autre pour l'OPC. [76]
Les premiers antécédents de la CIA étaient médiocres, l'agence étant incapable de fournir des renseignements suffisants sur les prises de contrôle soviétiques de la Roumanie et de la Tchécoslovaquie , le blocus soviétique de Berlin et le projet soviétique de bombe atomique . En particulier, l'agence n'a pas prédit l'entrée de la Chine dans la guerre de Corée avec 300 000 soldats. [77] [78] Le célèbre agent double Kim Philby était la liaison britannique avec le renseignement central américain. Grâce à lui, la CIA a coordonné des centaines de parachutages à l'intérieur du rideau de fer, tous compromis par Philby. Arlington Hall , le centre névralgique de la cryptanalyse de la CIA, a été compromis parBill Weisband , traducteur russe et espion soviétique. [79]
Cependant, la CIA a réussi à influencer les élections italiennes de 1948 en faveur des démocrates-chrétiens . [80] Le Fonds de stabilisation des changes de 200 millions de dollars , destiné à la reconstruction de l'Europe, a été utilisé pour payer les riches Américains d'origine italienne. L'argent a ensuite été distribué à l'Action catholique , le bras politique du Vatican , et directement aux politiciens italiens. Cette tactique consistant à utiliser son gros fonds pour acheter des élections a été fréquemment répétée au cours des années suivantes. [81]
guerre de Corée
Au début de la guerre de Corée, l'officier de la CIA Hans Tofte a affirmé avoir transformé un millier d'expatriés nord-coréens en une force de guérilla chargée d'infiltration, de guérilla et de sauvetage de pilotes. [82] En 1952, la CIA envoya 1 500 agents expatriés supplémentaires vers le nord. Le chef de la station de Séoul , Albert Haney, célébrerait ouvertement les capacités de ces agents et les informations qu'ils ont envoyées. [82] En septembre 1952, Haney a été remplacé par John Limond Hart, un vétéran de l'Europe avec une mémoire vive pour des expériences amères de désinformation. [82]Hart se méfiait du défilé de succès rapporté par Tofte et Haney et a lancé une enquête qui a déterminé que l'intégralité des informations fournies par les sources coréennes était fausse ou trompeuse. [83] Après la guerre, les examens internes de la CIA corroboreraient les conclusions de Hart. La station de la CIA à Séoul comptait 200 officiers, mais pas un seul locuteur de coréen. [83]Hart a signalé à Washington que la gare de Séoul était sans espoir et ne pouvait pas être récupérée. Loftus Becker, directeur adjoint du renseignement, a été envoyé personnellement pour dire à Hart que la CIA devait garder la station ouverte pour sauver la face. Becker est retourné à Washington, a déclaré que la situation était « sans espoir » et qu'après avoir visité les opérations de la CIA en Extrême-Orient, la capacité de la CIA à recueillir des renseignements en Extrême-Orient était « presque négligeable ». [83] Il a ensuite démissionné. Le colonel de l'Air Force James Kallis a déclaré que le directeur de la CIA, Allen Dulles, continuait de faire l'éloge de la force coréenne de la CIA, tout en sachant qu'elle était sous contrôle ennemi. [84]Lorsque la Chine est entrée en guerre en 1950, la CIA a tenté un certain nombre d'opérations subversives dans le pays, qui ont toutes échoué en raison de la présence d'agents doubles. Des millions de dollars ont été dépensés dans ces efforts. [85] Ceux-ci comprenaient une équipe de jeunes officiers de la CIA largués en Chine qui ont été pris en embuscade, et les fonds de la CIA utilisés pour mettre en place un empire mondial de l'héroïne dans le Triangle d'Or de la Birmanie à la suite d'une trahison par un autre agent double. [85]
1953 coup d'État iranien
En 1951, Mohammad Mosaddegh , membre du Front national , est élu premier ministre iranien. [86] En tant que Premier ministre, il a nationalisé l' Anglo-Iranian Oil Company que son prédécesseur avait soutenue. La nationalisation de l'industrie pétrolière iranienne financée par les Britanniques, y compris la plus grande raffinerie de pétrole au monde, a été désastreuse pour Mosaddegh. Un embargo naval britannique a fermé les installations pétrolières britanniques, que l'Iran n'avait pas de travailleurs qualifiés à exploiter. En 1952, Mosaddegh a résisté au refus royal d'approuver son ministre de la Guerre et a démissionné en signe de protestation. Le Front national est descendu dans la rue pour protester. Craignant une perte de contrôle, l'armée a retiré ses troupes cinq jours plus tard, et Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavicéda aux exigences de Mosaddegh. Mosaddegh a rapidement remplacé les chefs militaires fidèles au Shah par ceux qui lui étaient fidèles, lui donnant ainsi un contrôle personnel sur l'armée. Compte tenu de six mois de pouvoirs d'urgence, Mosaddegh a adopté unilatéralement une loi. À l'expiration de ces six mois, ses pouvoirs ont été prolongés d'un an. En 1953, Mossadegh a démis de ses fonctions le parlement et a assumé des pouvoirs dictatoriaux. Cette prise de pouvoir a incité le Shah à exercer son droit constitutionnel de destituer Mosaddegh. Mosaddegh a lancé un coup d' État militairealors que le Shah fuyait le pays. Sous la direction du directeur de la CIA Allen Dulles, l'opération Ajax a été lancée. Son objectif était de renverser Mossadegh avec le soutien militaire du général Fazlollah Zahedi et d'installer un régime pro-occidental dirigé par le Shah d'Iran. Kermit Roosevelt Jr. a supervisé l'opération en Iran. [87] Le 16 août, son nouveau cercle militaire intérieur a protégé une foule payée par la CIA dirigée par l'ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini qui déclencherait ce qu'un officier de l'ambassade des États-Unis a appelé « une révolution presque spontanée » [88] mais Mosaddegh et la CIA avaient été incapables de gagner influence au sein de l'armée iranienne. Leur élu, l'ancien général Fazlollah Zahedi , n'avait pas de troupes à mobiliser. [89]Après l'échec du premier coup d'État, Roosevelt a payé des manifestants pour qu'ils se fassent passer pour des communistes et défigurent les symboles publics associés au Shah. Cet incident du 19 août a contribué à favoriser le soutien du public au Shah et a mené des gangs de citoyens dans une vague de violence visant à détruire Mossadegh. [90] Une attaque contre sa maison forcerait Mossadegh à fuir. Il se rendit le lendemain et son coup d'État prit fin. [91]
1954 coup d'État guatémaltèque
Le retour du Shah au pouvoir et l'impression, cultivée par Allen Dulles , qu'une CIA efficace avait été en mesure de guider cette nation vers des relations amicales et stables avec l'Occident ont déclenché la planification de l'opération PBSuccess, un plan visant à renverser le président guatémaltèque Jacobo Arbenz. . [92] Le plan a été exposé dans les principaux journaux avant qu'il ne se produise après qu'un agent de la CIA ait laissé des plans pour le coup d'État dans sa chambre d'hôtel à Guatemala City . [93]
La révolution guatémaltèque de 1944-1954 a renversé le dictateur soutenu par les États-Unis Jorge Ubico et a amené un gouvernement démocratiquement élu au pouvoir. Le gouvernement a lancé un ambitieux programme de réforme agraire en essayant d'octroyer des terres à des millions de paysans sans terre. Ce programme menaçait les propriétés foncières de la United Fruit Company , qui faisait pression pour un coup d'État en présentant ces réformes comme communistes. [94] [95] [96] [97]
Le 18 juin 1954, Carlos Castillo Armas a conduit 480 hommes formés par la CIA à travers la frontière du Honduras au Guatemala. Les armes provenaient également de la CIA. [98] La CIA a également monté une campagne psychologique pour convaincre le peuple et le gouvernement guatémaltèques que la victoire d'Armas était un fait accompli , dont la plus grande partie était une émission de radio intitulée "La voix de la libération" qui annonçait que les exilés guatémaltèques dirigés par Castillo Armas allait bientôt libérer le pays. [98] Le 25 juin, un avion de la CIA a bombardé Guatemala City, détruisant les principales réserves de pétrole du gouvernement. Árbenz a ordonné à l'armée de distribuer des armes aux paysans et aux ouvriers locaux. [99]L'armée a refusé, forçant la démission de Jacobo Árbenz le 27 juin 1954. Árbenz a remis le pouvoir au colonel Carlos Enrique Diaz . [99] La CIA a ensuite orchestré une série de transferts de pouvoir qui s'est terminée par la confirmation de Castillo Armas comme président en juillet 1954. [99] Armas a été le premier d'une série de dictateurs militaires qui allaient gouverner le pays, conduisant à la brutalité guatémaltèque. Guerre civile de 1960 à 1996, au cours de laquelle quelque 200 000 personnes ont été tuées, principalement par l'armée soutenue par les États-Unis. [94] [100] [101] [102] [103] [104]
Syrie
En 1949, le colonel Adib Shishakli est arrivé au pouvoir en Syrie lors d'un coup d'État soutenu par la CIA. Quatre ans plus tard, il sera renversé par les militaires, les baasistes et les communistes. La CIA et le MI6 ont commencé à financer des militaires de droite, mais ont subi un énorme revers au lendemain de la crise de Suez . L'agent de la CIA Rocky Stone, qui avait joué un rôle mineur dans la révolution iranienne, travaillait à l' ambassade de Damas en tant que diplomate mais était le chef de station. Des officiers syriens sur le chômage de la CIA sont rapidement apparus à la télévision, déclarant qu'ils avaient reçu de l'argent d'"Américains corrompus et sinistres" "dans le but de renverser le gouvernement légitime de la Syrie". [105]Les forces syriennes ont encerclé l'ambassade et ont renversé l'agent Stone, qui a avoué et est ensuite entré dans l'histoire en tant que premier diplomate américain expulsé d'une nation arabe. Cela a renforcé les liens entre la Syrie et l'Égypte, aidant à établir la République arabe unie et empoisonnant le puits des États-Unis dans un avenir prévisible. [105]
Indonésie
Le leader charismatique de l' Indonésie était le président Sukarno . Sa déclaration de neutralité pendant la guerre froide a mis sur lui les soupçons de la CIA. Après que Sukarno ait accueilli la conférence de Bandung , promouvant le Mouvement des non-alignés , la Maison Blanche d'Eisenhower a répondu avec NSC 5518 autorisant « tous les moyens secrets possibles » pour déplacer l'Indonésie dans la sphère occidentale. [106]
Les États-Unis n'avaient pas de politique claire à l'égard de l'Indonésie. Eisenhower a envoyé son assistant spécial pour les opérations de sécurité, FM Dearborn Jr., à Jakarta. Son rapport selon lequel il y avait une grande instabilité et que les États-Unis manquaient d'alliés stables, a renforcé la théorie des dominos. L'Indonésie a souffert de ce qu'il a qualifié de "subversion par la démocratie". [107] La CIA a décidé de tenter un autre coup d'État militaire en Indonésie, où l'armée indonésienne était entraînée par les États-Unis, avait de solides relations professionnelles avec l'armée américaine, avait un corps d'officiers pro-américains qui soutenait fortement leur gouvernement, et un fort croyance dans le contrôle civil de l'armée, inculquée en partie par son étroite association avec l'armée américaine. [108]
Le 25 septembre 1957, Eisenhower ordonna à la CIA de déclencher une révolution en Indonésie dans le but d'un changement de régime. Trois jours plus tard, Blitz , un hebdomadaire en Inde contrôlé par les Soviétiques [109], rapporta que les États-Unis complotaient pour renverser Sukarno. L'histoire a été reprise par les médias en Indonésie. L' une des premières parties de l'opération était une US Navy 11500 tonnes navire atterrissage à Sumatra , la livraison d' armes pour moins de 8000 révolutionnaires potentiels. [110] [ échec de la vérification ]
En soutien au gouvernement révolutionnaire de la République d'Indonésie - Mouvement Permesta , formé par des commandants militaires dissidents dans le centre de Sumatera et le nord de Sulawesi dans le but de renverser le régime de Sukarno, un B-26 piloté par l'agent de la CIA Allen Lawrence Pope a attaqué des cibles militaires indonésiennes en avril et mai 1958. [111] La CIA a qualifié les frappes aériennes du président d'attaques d'"avions dissidents". Le B-26 de Pope a été abattu au-dessus d'Ambon, en Indonésie, le 18 mai 1958, et il a renfloué. Lorsqu'il a été capturé, l'armée indonésienne a trouvé ses dossiers personnels, ses rapports après action et sa carte de membre du club des officiers à Clark Field . Le 9 marsFoster Dulles , le secrétaire d'État, et frère de DCI Allen Dulles a fait une déclaration publique appelant à une révolte contre le despotisme communiste sous Sukarno. Trois jours plus tard, la CIA rapporta à la Maison Blanche que les actions de l'armée indonésienne contre la révolution soutenue par la CIA supprimaient le communisme. [112]
Après l'Indonésie, Eisenhower a fait preuve de méfiance à la fois envers la CIA et son directeur, Allen Dulles. Dulles affichait également une méfiance envers la CIA elle-même. L'abbé Smith, un analyste de la CIA qui devint plus tard le chef du Bureau des estimations nationales, a déclaré : « Nous nous étions construit une image de l'URSS, et tout ce qui s'est passé devait être adapté à cette image. Les estimateurs du renseignement peuvent difficilement commettre un péché plus abominable." Le 16 décembre, Eisenhower a reçu un rapport de son conseil d'administration du renseignement selon lequel l'agence était "incapable de faire des évaluations objectives de ses propres informations de renseignement ainsi que de ses propres opérations". [113]
République Démocratique du Congo
Lors de l'élection de Patrice Lumumba au poste de Premier ministre et de son acceptation du soutien soviétique pendant la crise congolaise , la CIA a vu un autre Cuba possible. Ce point de vue a influencé la Maison Blanche. Eisenhower a ordonné que Lumumba soit "éliminé". En septembre 1960, le président Joseph Kasa-Vubu ordonna la destitution de Lumumba et de son cabinet. La CIA a remis un quart de million de dollars à Joseph Mobutu en octobre, leur personnalité politique congolaise préférée. Lumumba a été emprisonné par Mobutu en décembre puis remis aux autorités katangaises qui, avec l'aide de la Belgique, l'ont exécuté par peloton d'exécution en janvier 1961. [114]
Abattage de Gary Powers U-2
Après le trou des bombardiers est venu le trou des missiles . Eisenhower voulait utiliser l' U-2 pour réfuter le Missile Gap, mais il avait interdit les survols U-2 de l'URSS après avoir rencontré le secrétaire Khrouchtchev à Camp David. Une autre raison pour laquelle le président s'est opposé à l'utilisation de l'U-2 était que, à l'ère nucléaire, les renseignements dont il avait le plus besoin concernaient leurs intentions, sans lesquelles les États-Unis seraient confrontés à une paralysie du renseignement. Il était particulièrement inquiet que les vols U-2 puissent être considérés comme des préparatifs d'attaques de première frappe. Il fondait de grands espoirs sur une prochaine rencontre avec Khrouchtchev à Paris. Eisenhower a finalement cédé à la pression de la CIA pour autoriser une fenêtre de 16 jours pour les vols, qui a été prolongée de six jours supplémentaires en raison du mauvais temps. Le 1er mai 1960, l'URSS abattit un U-2 survolant le territoire soviétique. Pour Eisenhower, la dissimulation qui a suivi a détruit son honnêteté perçue et son espoir de laisser un héritage de dégel des relations avec Khrouchtchev.Cela marquerait également le début d'une longue chute de la crédibilité du bureau du président des États-Unis. Eisenhower a déclaré plus tard que la dissimulation de U-2 était le plus grand regret de sa présidence.[115] : 160
République dominicaine
Les violations des droits humains du généralissime Rafael Trujillo ont duré plus de trois décennies avant que les États-Unis ne rompent leurs relations diplomatiques avec la République dominicaine en août 1960. Le groupe spécial de la CIA a armé les Dominicains pour assassiner Trujillo, mais Kennedy a suspendu le plan lorsqu'il est devenu président. Kennedy a autorisé la distribution de quatre mitrailleuses supplémentaires, et Trujillo est décédé des suites de blessures par balle deux semaines plus tard, le 30 mai 1961. Dans la foulée, Robert Kennedy a écrit que la CIA avait réussi là où elle avait échoué à plusieurs reprises dans le passé, mais en face de ce succès, il a été pris au dépourvu, n'ayant pas planifié quoi faire ensuite. [116]
Baie des cochons
La CIA a accueilli Fidel Castro lors de sa visite à Washington et lui a donné un briefing en face à face. La CIA espérait que Castro mettrait en place un gouvernement démocratique amical et prévoyait de s'attirer ses faveurs avec de l'argent et des armes à feu. Le 11 décembre 1959, une note parvint au bureau de la DCI recommandant « l'élimination » de Castro. Dulles a remplacé le mot « élimination » par « retrait » et a mis les roues en mouvement. [ expression familière ] À la mi-août 1960, Dick Bissell chercherait, avec la bénédiction de la CIA, à engager la mafia pour assassiner Castro. [118]
L' invasion de la Baie des Cochons était une invasion militaire ratée de Cuba entreprise par le groupe paramilitaire parrainé par la CIA Brigade 2506 le 17 avril 1961. Une armée contre-révolutionnaire, entraînée et financée par la CIA, la Brigade 2506 a fait face à la branche armée de la Démocratie Front révolutionnaire (DRF) et destiné à renverser le gouvernement de plus en plus communiste de Fidel Castro . Lancée depuis le Guatemala , la force d'invasion a été vaincue en trois jours par les Forces armées révolutionnaires cubaines , sous le commandement direct du Premier ministre Fidel Castro. Le président américain Dwight D. Eisenhowerétait préoccupé par la direction que prenait le gouvernement de Castro, et en mars 1960, Eisenhower a alloué 13,1 millions de dollars à la CIA pour planifier le renversement de Castro. La CIA a procédé à l'organisation de l'opération avec l'aide de diverses forces contre-révolutionnaires cubaines, formant la brigade 2506 au Guatemala. Plus de 1 400 paramilitaires sont partis en bateau pour Cuba le 13 avril. Deux jours plus tard, le 15 avril, huit bombardiers B-26 fournis par la CIA ont attaqué des aérodromes cubains. Dans la nuit du 16 avril, l'invasion principale a débarqué dans la baie des Cochons , mais le 20 avril, les envahisseurs se sont finalement rendus. L'invasion ratée a renforcé la position du leadership de Castro ainsi que ses liens avec l'URSS. Cela a finalement conduit aux événements de la crise des missiles de Cubade 1962. L'invasion a été un embarras majeur pour la politique étrangère américaine . Le président américain John F. Kennedy a ordonné un certain nombre d'enquêtes internes à travers l' Amérique latine . [ citation nécessaire ]
Le conseil de Taylor a été chargé de déterminer ce qui n'allait pas à Cuba. Le Conseil est arrivé à la même conclusion que le Conseil des consultants du président de janvier 61 sur les activités de renseignement étranger avait conclu, et de nombreux autres examens antérieurs et à venir, que l'action secrète devait être complètement isolée du renseignement et de l'analyse. L' inspecteur général de la CIA a enquêté sur la Baie des Cochons. Il a conclu qu'il était nécessaire d'améliorer considérablement l'organisation et la gestion de la CIA. Le Groupe spécial (rebaptisé plus tard le Comité 303) a été convoqué dans un rôle de supervision. [ citation nécessaire ]
Cuba : sabotage et terrorisme
Après l'échec de la tentative d'invasion de la Baie des Cochons, la CIA a proposé un programme de sabotage et d'attaques terroristes contre des cibles civiles et militaires à Cuba, dans le but de renverser l'administration cubaine et d'instituer un nouveau gouvernement. Il a été autorisé par le président en novembre 1961 et appelé Opération Mangouste. [119] [120] [121] [122] L'opération a vu la CIA s'engager dans une vaste campagne d' attaques terroristes contre des civils et des cibles économiques, tuant un nombre important de civils et mener des opérations secrètes contre le gouvernement cubain. [120] [123] [124] [125] La CIA a établi une base pour l'opération à Miami, étant donné le cryptonymeJMWAVE . L'opération était si vaste qu'elle abritait le plus grand nombre d'officiers de la CIA à l'extérieur de Langley avec 400 stationnés là-bas. La CIA était un employeur majeur à Miami dans les années 1960, avec plusieurs milliers d'agents dans la masse salariale des agences. [126] [127]
Les activités terroristes menées par des agents armés, organisés et parrainés par la CIA ont été une autre source de tension entre les gouvernements américain et cubain. Ils ont été un facteur majeur contribuant à la décision soviétique de placer des missiles sur Cuba, conduisant à la crise des missiles de Cuba à la fin de 1962. L'opération Mongoose s'est officiellement arrêtée au début de 1963. [128] [129] Les attaques à Cuba se sont poursuivies jusqu'en 1965. [129] Bien que le niveau d'activité terroriste dirigée par la CIA ait diminué dans la seconde moitié des années 1960, en 1969, la CIA a été dirigée par Nixon pour intensifier les opérations secrètes contre Cuba. [130]Malgré les dégâts causés et les civils tués dans les attaques terroristes de la CIA, l'opération Mangouste et les opérations qui ont suivi ont complètement échoué dans leurs objectifs déclarés d'amener un changement de régime à Cuba. [123] [124]
Des terroristes cubains en exil étaient encore à la solde de la CIA au milieu des années 1970, dont Luis Posada Carriles , qui est soupçonné d'être responsable de l' attentat contre le vol Cubana 455 d' octobre 1976 , qui a fait 73 morts. Carriles était à la solde de la CIA jusqu'en février 1976. [131] [132] [133]
Début de la guerre froide, 1953-1966
La CIA a été impliquée dans des activités anticommunistes en Birmanie, au Congo, au Guatemala et au Laos. [134] Il y a eu des suggestions que la tentative soviétique de mettre des missiles à Cuba est venue, indirectement, quand ils ont réalisé à quel point ils avaient été compromis par un transfuge américano-britannique en place, Oleg Penkovsky . [135] L'une des opérations les plus importantes jamais entreprises par la CIA a été dirigée contre le Zaïre en soutien au général devenu dictateur Mobutu Sese Seko . [136]
Brésil
The CIA and the United States government were involved in the 1964 Brazilian coup d'état. The coup occurred from March 31 to April 1, which resulted in the Brazilian Armed Forces ousting President João Goulart. The United States saw Goulart as a left-wing threat in Latin America. Secret cables written by the US Ambassador to Brazil, Lincoln Gordon, confirmed that the CIA was involved in covert action in Brazil. The CIA encouraged "pro-democracy street rallies" in Brazil, for instance, to create dissent against Goulart.[137]
Indochina, Tibet and the Vietnam War (1954–1975)
The OSS Patti mission arrived in Vietnam near the end of World War II, and had significant interaction with the leaders of many Vietnamese factions, including Ho Chi Minh.[138]
The CIA Tibetan program consisted of political plots, propaganda distribution, and paramilitary and intelligence gathering based on U.S. commitments made to the Dalai Lama in 1951 and 1956.[139]
During the period of U.S. combat involvement in the Vietnam War, there was considerable argument about progress among the Department of Defense under Robert McNamara, the CIA, and, to some extent, the intelligence staff of Military Assistance Command Vietnam.[140]
Sometime between 1959 and 1961, the CIA started Project Tiger, a program of dropping South Vietnamese agents into North Vietnam to gather intelligence. These were failures; the Deputy Chief for Project Tiger, Captain Do Van Tien, admitted that he was an agent for Hanoi.[141]
Johnson
In the face of the failure of Project Tiger, the Pentagon wanted CIA paramilitary forces to participate in their Op Plan 64A. This resulted in the CIA's foreign paramilitaries being put under the command of the DOD, a move seen as a slippery slope inside the CIA, a slide from covert action towards militarization.[142]
The antiwar movement rapidly expanded across the United States during the Johnson presidency. Johnson wanted CIA Director Richard Helms to substantiate Johnson's hunch that Moscow and Beijing were financing and influencing the American antiwar movement. Thus, in the fall of 1967, the CIA launched a domestic surveillance program code-named Chaos that would linger for a total of seven years. Police departments across the country cooperated in tandem with the agency, amassing a "computer index of 300,000 names of American people and organizations, and extensive files on 7,200 citizens." Helms hatched a "Special Operations Group" in which "[eleven] CIA officers grew long hair, learned the jargon of the New Left, and went off to infiltrate peace groups in the United States and Europe."[143]
A CIA analyst's assessment of Vietnam was that the US was "becoming progressively divorced from reality... [and] proceeding with far more courage than wisdom".[144]
Nixon
In 1971, the NSA and CIA were engaged in domestic spying. The DOD was eavesdropping on Kissinger. The White House and Camp David were wired for sound. Nixon and Kissinger were eavesdropping on their aides, as well as reporters. Famously, Nixon's Plumbers had in their number many former CIA agents, including Howard Hunt, Jim McCord, and Eugenio Martinez. On July 7, 1971, John Ehrlichman, Nixon's domestic policy chief, told DCI Cushman, Nixon's hatchet-man in the CIA, to let Cushman "know that [Hunt] was, in fact, doing some things for the President... you should consider he has pretty much carte blanche"[145] Importantly, this included a camera, disguises, a voice-altering device, and ID papers furnished by the CIA, as well as the CIA's participation developing film from the burglary Hunt staged on the office of Pentagon Papers leaker Daniel Ellsberg's psychologist.[citation needed]
On June 17, Nixon's Plumbers were caught burglarizing the DNC offices in the Watergate. On June 23, DCI Helms was ordered by the White House to wave the FBI off using national security as a pretext. The new DCI, Walters, another Nixon hack, called the acting director of the FBI and told him to drop the investigation as ordered.[146] On June 26, Nixon's counsel John Dean ordered DCI Walters to pay the plumbers untraceable hush money. The CIA was the only part of the government that had the power to make off the book payments, but it could only be done on the orders of the CI, or, if he was out of the country, the DCI. The Acting Director of the FBI started breaking ranks. He demanded the CIA produce a signed document attesting to the national security threat of the investigation. Jim McCord's lawyer contacted the CIA informing them that McCord had been offered a Presidential pardon if he fingered the CIA, testifying that the break-in had been an operation of the CIA. Nixon had long been frustrated by what he saw as a liberal infection inside the CIA and had been trying for years to tear the CIA out by its roots. McCord wrote "If [DCI] Helms goes (takes the fall) and the Watergate operation is laid at the CIA's feet, where it does not belong, every tree in the forest will fall. It will be a scorched desert."[147]
On November 13, after Nixon's landslide re-election, Nixon told Kissinger "[I intend] to ruin the Foreign Service. I mean ruin it – the old Foreign Service – and to build a new one." He had similar designs for the CIA and intended to replace Helms with James Schlesinger.[147] Nixon had told Helms that he was on the way out, and promised that Helms could stay on until his 60th birthday, the mandatory retirement age. On February 2, Nixon broke that promise, carrying through with his intention to "remove the deadwood" from the CIA. "Get rid of the clowns" was his order to the incoming CI. Kissinger had been running the CIA since the beginning of Nixon's presidency, but Nixon impressed on Schlesinger that he must appear to Congress to be in charge, averting their suspicion of Kissinger's involvement.[148] Nixon also hoped that Schlesinger could push through broader changes in the intelligence community that he had been working towards for years, the creation of a Director of National Intelligence, and spinning off the covert action part of the CIA into a separate organ. Before Helms would leave office, he would destroy every tape he had secretly made of meetings in his office, and many of the papers on Project MKUltra. In Schlesinger's 17-week tenure, in his assertion to President Nixon that it was "imperative to cut back on 'the prominence of CIA operations' around the world," the director fired more than 1,500 employees.[149] As Watergate threw the spotlight on the CIA, Schlesinger, who had been kept in the dark about the CIA's involvement, decided he needed to know what skeletons were in the closet. He issued a memo to every CIA employee directing them to disclose to him any CIA activity they knew of past or present that could fall outside the scope of the CIA's charter.[citation needed]
This became the Family Jewels. It included information linking the CIA to the assassination of foreign leaders, the illegal surveillance of some 7,000 U.S. citizens involved in the antiwar movement (Operation CHAOS), the CIA had also experimented on U.S. and Canadian citizens without their knowledge, secretly giving them LSD (among other things) and observing the results.[150] This prompted Congress to create the Church Committee in the Senate, and the Pike Committee in the House. President Gerald Ford created the Rockefeller Commission,[150] and issued an executive order prohibiting the assassination of foreign leaders. DCI Colby leaked the papers to the press, later he stated that he believed that providing Congress with this information was the correct thing to do, and ultimately in the CIA's interests.[151]
Congressional Investigations
Acting Attorney General Laurence Silberman learned of the existence of the Family Jewels and issued a subpoena for them, prompting eight congressional investigations on the domestic spying activities of the CIA. Bill Colby's short tenure as DCI would end with the Halloween Massacre. His replacement was George H.W. Bush. At the time, the DOD had control of 80% of the intelligence budget.[152] Communication and coordination between the CIA and the DOD would suffer greatly under Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The CIA's budget for hiring clandestine officers had been squeezed out by the paramilitary operations in south-east Asia, and the government's poor popularity further strained hiring. This left the agency bloated with middle management, and anemic in younger officers. With employee training taking five years, the agency's only hope would be on the trickle of new officers coming to fruition years in the future. The CIA would see another setback as communists would take Angola. William J. Casey, a member of Ford's Intelligence Advisory Board, obtained Bush's approval to allow a team from outside the CIA to produce Soviet military estimates as a "Team B." The "B" team was composed of hawks. Their estimates were the highest that could be justified, and they painted a picture of a growing Soviet military when the Soviet military was indeed shrinking. Many of their reports found their way to the press. As a result of the investigations, congressional oversight of the CIA eventually evolved into a select intelligence committee in the House, and Senate supervising covert actions authorized by the President.[citation needed]
Chad
Chad's neighbor Libya was a major source of weaponry to communist rebel forces. The CIA seized the opportunity to arm and finance Chad's Prime Minister, Hissène Habré, after he created a breakaway government in western Sudan,[153] even giving him Stinger missiles.[154]
Afghanistan
In Afghanistan, the CIA funneled $40 billion worth of weapons,[155] which included over two thousand FIM-92 Stinger surface-to-air missiles,[156] to Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which funneled them to almost 100,000 Afghan resistance fighters, notably the Mujahideen, and foreign "Afghan Arabs" from forty Muslim countries.[157][158]
Iran/Contra
Under President Jimmy Carter, the CIA was conducting covertly funded pro-American opposition against the Sandinista. In March 1981, Reagan told Congress that the CIA would protect El Salvador by preventing the shipment of Nicaraguan arms into the country to arm Communist rebels. This was a ruse. The CIA was arming and training Nicaraguans Contras in Honduras in hopes that they could depose the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.[159] DCI William J. Casey formed the Central American Task Force, staffed with yes men from Covert Action.[159] On December 21, 1982, Congress passed a law restricting the CIA to its stated mission, restricting the flow of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador, prohibiting the use of funds to oust the Sandinistas. Reagan testified before Congress, assuring them that the CIA was not trying to topple the Nicaraguan government.[citation needed]
Lebanon
The CIA's prime source in Lebanon was Bashir Gemayel, a member of the Christian Maronite sect. The uprising against the Maronite minority blindsided the CIA. Israel invaded Lebanon, and, along with the CIA, propped up Gemayel. This secured Gemayel's assurance that Americans would be protected in Lebanon. Thirteen days later he was assassinated. Imad Mughniyah, a Hezbollah assassin, targeted Americans in retaliation for the Israeli invasion, the Sabra and Shatila massacre, and the US Marines of the Multi-National Force for their role in opposing the PLO in Lebanon. On April 18, 1983, a 2,000 lb car bomb exploded in the lobby of the American embassy in Beirut, killing 63 people, including 17 Americans and 7 CIA officers, including Robert Ames, one of the CIA's Middle East experts. America's fortunes in Lebanon suffered more as America's poorly-directed retaliation for the bombing was interpreted by many as support for the Maronite minority. On October 23, 1983, two bombs (1983 Beirut Bombing) were set off in Beirut, including a 10-ton bomb at a US military barracks that killed 242 people.
The Embassy bombing killed the CIA's Beirut Station Chief, Ken Haas. Bill Buckley was sent in to replace him. Eighteen days after the US Marines left Lebanon, Buckley was kidnapped. On March 7, 1984, Jeremy Levin, CNN Bureau Chief in Beirut, was kidnapped. Twelve more Americans were captured in Beirut during the Reagan Administration. Manucher Ghorbanifar, a former Savak agent, was an information seller, and was discredited over his record of misinformation. He reached out to the agency offering a back channel to Iran, suggesting a trade of missiles that would be lucrative to the intermediaries.[160]
Pakistan
It has been alleged by such authors as Ahmed Rashid that the CIA and ISI have been waging a clandestine war. The Afghan Taliban – with whom the United States is officially in conflict – is headquartered in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas and according to some reports is largely funded by the ISI.[citation needed] The Pakistani government denies this.
India–Pakistan geopolitical tensions
On May 11, 1998, CIA Director George Tenet and his agency were taken aback by India's second nuclear test. The bellicose gesture ruffled the feathers[colloquialism] of its nuclear-capable adversary, Pakistan, and, furthermore, "remade the balance of power in the world." The nuclear test was New Delhi's calculated response to Pakistan previously testing new missiles in its expanding arsenal. This series of events subsequently revealed the CIA's "failure of espionage, a failure to read photographs, a failure to comprehend reports, a failure to think, and a failure to see."[161]
Poland 1980–1989
Unlike the Carter Administration, the Reagan Administration supported the Solidarity movement in Poland, and – based on CIA intelligence – waged a public relations campaign to deter what the Carter administration felt was "an imminent move by large Soviet military forces into Poland." Colonel Ryszard Kukliński, a senior officer on the Polish General Staff, was secretly sending reports to the CIA.[162] The CIA transferred around $2 million yearly in cash to Solidarity, which suggests that $10 million total is a reasonable estimate for the five-year total. There were no direct links between the CIA and Solidarnosc, and all money was channeled through third parties.[163] CIA officers were barred from meeting Solidarity leaders, and the CIA's contacts with Solidarnosc activists were weaker than those of the AFL-CIO, which raised 300 thousand dollars from its members, which were used to provide material and cash directly to Solidarity, with no control of Solidarity's use of it. The U.S. Congress authorized the National Endowment for Democracy to promote democracy, and the NED allocated $10 million to Solidarity.[164] When the Polish government launched a crackdown of its own in December 1981, however, Solidarity was not alerted. Potential explanations for this vary; some believe that the CIA was caught off guard, while others suggest that American policy-makers viewed an internal crackdown as preferable to an "inevitable Soviet intervention."[165] CIA support for Solidarity included money, equipment and training, which was coordinated by Special Operations CIA division.[166] Henry Hyde, U.S. House intelligence committee member, stated that USA provided "supplies and technical assistance in terms of clandestine newspapers, broadcasting, propaganda, money, organizational help and advice".[167] Michael Reisman from Yale Law School named operations in Poland as one of the covert actions of CIA during Cold War.[168] Initial funds for covert actions by CIA were $2 million, but soon after authorization was increased and by 1985 CIA successfully infiltrated Poland[169] Rainer Thiel in Nested Games of External Democracy Promotion: The United States and the Polish Liberalization 1980–1989 mentions how covert operations by CIA and spy games among others allowed USA to proceed with successful regime change.[170]
Operation Desert Storm
During the Iran-Iraq war, the CIA had backed both sides. The CIA had maintained a network of spies in Iran, but in 1989 a CIA mistake compromised every agent they had in there, and the CIA had no agents in Iraq. In the weeks before the Invasion of Kuwait, the CIA downplayed the military buildup. During the war, CIA estimates of Iraqi abilities and intentions flip-flopped and were rarely accurate. In one particular case, the DOD had asked the CIA to identify military targets to bomb. One target the CIA identified was an underground shelter. The CIA didn't know that it was a civilian bomb shelter. In a rare instance, the CIA correctly determined that the coalition forces efforts were coming up short in their efforts to destroy SCUD missiles. Congress took away the CIA's role in interpreting spy-satellite photos, putting the CIA's satellite intelligence operations under the auspices of the military. The CIA created its office of military affairs, which operated as "second-echelon support for the Pentagon... answering... questions from military men [like] 'how wide is this road?'"[171]
Fall of the USSR
Gorbachev's announcement of the unilateral reduction of 500,000 Soviet troops took the CIA by surprise. Moreover, Doug MacEachin, the CIA's Chief of Soviet analysis, said that even if the CIA had told the President, the NSC, and Congress about the cuts beforehand, it would have been ignored. "We never would have been able to publish it."[172] All the CIA numbers on the USSR's economy were wrong. Too often the CIA relied on inexperienced people supposedly deemed experts. Bob Gates had preceded Doug MacEachin as Chief of Soviet analysis, and he had never visited Russia. Few officers, even those stationed in the country, spoke the language of the people on whom they spied. And the CIA could not send agents to respond to developing situations. The CIA analysis of Russia during the Cold War was either driven by ideology, or by politics. William J. Crowe, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted that the CIA "talked about the Soviet Union as if they weren't reading the newspapers, much less developed clandestine intelligence."[173]
President Clinton
On January 25, 1993, Mir Qazi opened fire at the CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, killing two agents and wounding three others. On February 26, Al-Qaeda terrorists led by Ramzi Yousef bombed the parking garage below the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City, killing six people and injuring 1,402 others.
During the Bosnian War, the CIA ignored signs within and without[clarification needed] of the Srebrenica massacre. On July 13, 1995, when the press report about the massacre came out, the CIA received pictures from spy satellite of prisoners guarded by men with guns in Srebrenica.[174] The CIA had no agents on the ground to verify the report. Two weeks after news reports of the slaughter, the CIA sent a U-2 to photograph it. A week later the CIA completed its report on the matter. The final report came to the Oval Office on August 4, 1995. In short, it took three weeks for the agency to confirm that one of the largest mass murders in Europe since the Second World War had occurred.[174] Another CIA mistake which occurred in the Balkans during the Clinton presidency was the NATO bombing of Serbia. To force Slobodan Milošević to withdraw his troops from Kosovo, the CIA had been invited to provide military targets for bombings, wherein the agency's analysts used tourist maps to determine the location.[175] However, the agency incorrectly provided the coordinates of the Chinese Embassy as a target resulting in its bombing. The CIA had misread the target as Slobodan Milosevic 's military depot.[176]
In France, the CIA had orders for economic intelligence; a female CIA agent revealed her connections to the CIA to the French. Dick Holm, Paris Station Chief, was expelled.[citation needed] In Guatemala, the CIA produced the Murphy Memo, based on audio recordings made by covert listening devices planted by Guatemalan intelligence in the bedroom of Ambassador Marilyn McAfee. In the recording, Ambassador McAfee verbally entreated "Murphy." The CIA circulated a memo in the highest Washington circles accusing Ambassador McAfee of having an extramarital lesbian affair with her secretary, Carol Murphy. There was no affair. Ambassador McAfee was calling to Murphy, her poodle.[177]
Harold James Nicholson would burn[clarification needed] several serving officers and three years of trainees before he was caught spying for Russia. In 1997 the House would pen another report, which said that CIA officers know little about the language or politics of the people they spy on; the conclusion was that the CIA lacked the "depth, breadth, and expertise to monitor political, military, and economic developments worldwide."[178] Russ Travers said in the CIA in-house journal that in five years "intelligence failure is inevitable".[179] In 1997 the CIA's new director George Tenet would promise a new working agency by 2002. The CIA's surprise at India's detonation of an atom bomb was a failure at almost every level. After the 1998 embassy bombings by Al Qaeda, the CIA offered two targets to be hit in retaliation. One of them was the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory, where traces of chemical weapon precursors had been detected. In the aftermath, it was concluded that "the decision to target al Shifa continues a tradition of operating on inadequate intelligence about Sudan." It triggered the CIA to make "substantial and sweeping changes" to prevent "a catastrophic systemic intelligence failure."[180] Between 1991 and 1998 the CIA lost 3,000 employees.[citation needed]
Aldrich Ames
Between 1985 and 1986, the CIA lost every spy it had in Eastern Europe. The details of the investigation into the cause were obscured from the new Director, and the investigation had little success and has been widely criticized. On February 21, 1994, FBI agents pulled Aldrich Ames out of his Jaguar.[181] In the investigation that ensued, the CIA discovered that many of the sources for its most important analyses of the USSR were based on Soviet disinformation fed to the CIA by controlled agents. On top of that, it was discovered that, in some cases, the CIA suspected at the time that the sources were compromised, but the information was sent up the chain as genuine.[182][183]
Osama bin Laden
Agency files show that it is believed Osama bin Laden was funding the Afghan rebels against the USSR in the 1980s.[184] In 1991, bin Laden returned to his native Saudi Arabia protesting the presence of troops, and Operation Desert Storm. He was expelled from the country. In 1996, the CIA created a team to hunt bin Laden. They were trading information with the Sudanese until, on the word of a source that would later be found to be a fabricator, the CIA closed its Sudan station later that year. In 1998, bin Laden would declare war on America, and, on August 7, strike in Tanzania and Nairobi. On October 12, 2000, Al Qaeda bombed the USS Cole. In the first days of George W. Bush's presidency, Al Qaeda threats were ubiquitous in daily presidential CIA briefings, but it may have become a case of crying wolf.[colloquialism] The agency's predictions were dire but carried little weight, and the focus of the president and his defense staff were elsewhere. The CIA arranged the arrests of suspected Al Qaeda members through cooperation with foreign agencies, but the CIA could not definitively say what effect these arrests have had, and it could not gain hard intelligence from those captured. The President had asked the CIA if Al Qaeda could plan attacks in the US. On August 6, Bush received a daily briefing with the headline, not based on current, solid intelligence, "Al Qaeda determined to strike inside the US." The US had been hunting bin Laden since 1996 and had had several opportunities, but neither Clinton, nor Bush had wanted to risk taking an active role in a murky assassination plot, and the perfect opportunity had never materialized for a DCI that would have given him the reassurances he needed to take the plunge. That day, Richard A. Clarke sent National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice warning of the risks, and decrying the inaction of the CIA.[185]
Al-Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism
The CIA had long been dealing with terrorism originating from abroad, and in 1986 had set up a Counterterrorist Center to deal specifically with the problem. At first, confronted with secular terrorism, the agency found Islamist terrorism looming increasingly large on its scope.[citation needed]
In January 1996, the CIA created an experimental "virtual station," the Bin Laden Issue Station, under the Counterterrorist Center, to track bin Laden's developing activities. Al-Fadl, who defected to the CIA in spring 1996, began to provide the Station with a new image of the Al Qaeda leader: he was not only a terrorist financier but a terrorist organizer as well. FBI Special Agent Dan Coleman (who together with his partner Jack Cloonan had been "seconded" to the bin Laden Station) called him Qaeda's "Rosetta Stone".[186]
In 1999, CIA chief George Tenet launched a plan to deal with al-Qaeda. The Counterterrorist Center, its new chief, Cofer Black, and the center's bin Laden unit were the plan's developers and executors. Once it was prepared, Tenet assigned CIA intelligence chief Charles E. Allen to set up a "Qaeda cell" to oversee its tactical execution.[187] In 2000, the CIA and USAF jointly ran a series of flights over Afghanistan with a small remote-controlled reconnaissance drone, the Predator; they obtained probable photos of bin Laden. Cofer Black and others became advocates of arming the Predator with missiles to try to assassinate bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders. After the Cabinet-level Principals Committee meeting on terrorism of September 4, 2001, the CIA resumed reconnaissance flights, the drones now being weapons-capable.[citation needed]
September 11 attacks and its aftermath
On September 11, 2001, 19 Al-Qaeda members hijacked four passenger jets within the Northeastern United States in a series of coordinated terrorist attacks. Two planes crashed into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, the third into the Pentagon in Arlington County, Virginia, and the fourth inadvertently into a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. The attacks cost the lives of 2,996 people (including the 19 hijackers), caused the destruction of the Twin Towers, and damaged the western side of the Pentagon. Soon after 9/11, The New York Times released a story stating that the CIA's New York field office was destroyed in the wake of the attacks. According to unnamed CIA sources, while first responders, military personnel and volunteers were conducting rescue efforts at the World Trade Center site, a special CIA team was searching the rubble for both digital and paper copies of classified documents. This was done according to well-rehearsed document recovery procedures put in place after the Iranian takeover of the United States Embassy in Tehran in 1979. While it was not confirmed whether the agency was able to retrieve the classified information, it is known that all agents present that day fled the building safely.[citation needed]
While the CIA insists that those who conducted the attacks on 9/11 were not aware that the agency was operating at 7 World Trade Center under the guise of another (unidentified) federal agency, this center was the headquarters for many notable criminal terrorism investigations. Though the New York field offices' main responsibilities were to monitor and recruit foreign officials stationed at the United Nations, the field office also handled the investigations of the August 1998 bombings of United States Embassies in East Africa and the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole.[188] Despite the fact that the 9/11 attacks may have damaged the CIA's New York branch, and they had to loan office space from the US Mission to the United Nations and other federal agencies, there was an upside for the CIA.[188] In the months immediately following 9/11, there was a huge increase in the number of applications for CIA positions. According to CIA representatives that spoke with The New York Times, pre-9/11 the agency received approximately 500 to 600 applications a week, in the months following 9/11 the agency received that number daily.[189]
The intelligence community as a whole, and especially the CIA, were involved in presidential planning immediately after the 9/11 attacks. In his address to the nation at 8:30pm on September 11, 2001, George W. Bush mentioned the intelligence community: "The search is underway for those who are behind these evil acts, I've directed the full resource of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and bring them to justice."[190]
The involvement of the CIA in the newly coined "War on Terror" was further increased on September 15, 2001. During a meeting at Camp David George W. Bush agreed to adopt a plan proposed by CIA director George Tenet. This plan consisted of conducting a covert war in which CIA paramilitary officers would cooperate with anti-Taliban guerillas inside Afghanistan. They would later be joined by small special operations forces teams which would call in precision airstrikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters. This plan was codified on September 16, 2001, with Bush's signature of an official Memorandum of Notification that allowed the plan to proceed.[191]
On November 25–27, 2001, Taliban prisoners revolted at the Qala Jangi prison west of Mazar-e-Sharif. Though several days of struggle occurred between the Taliban prisoners and the Northern Alliance members present, the prisoners gained the upper hand and obtained North Alliance weapons. At some point during this period Johnny "Mike" Spann, a CIA officer sent to question the prisoners, was beaten to death. He became the first American to die in combat in the war in Afghanistan.[191]
After 9/11, the CIA came under criticism for not having done enough to prevent the attacks. Tenet rejected the criticism, citing the agency's planning efforts especially over the preceding two years. He also considered that the CIA's efforts had put the agency in a position to respond rapidly and effectively to the attacks, both in the "Afghan sanctuary" and in "ninety-two countries around the world".[192][193] The new strategy was called the "Worldwide Attack Matrix".
Anwar al-Awlaki, a Yemeni-American U.S. citizen and al-Qaeda member, was killed on September 30, 2011, by an airstrike conducted by the Joint Special Operations Command. After several days of surveillance of Awlaki by the Central Intelligence Agency, armed drones took off from a new, secret American base in the Arabian Peninsula, crossed into northern Yemen, and fired several Hellfire missiles at al-Awlaki's vehicle. Samir Khan, a Pakistani-American al-Qaeda member and editor of the jihadist Inspire magazine, also reportedly died in the attack. The combined CIA/JSOC drone strike was the first in Yemen since 2002 – there have been others by the military's Special Operations forces – and was part of an effort by the spy agency to duplicate in Yemen the covert war which has been running in Afghanistan and Pakistan.[194][195]
Use of vaccination program in hunt for Osama bin Laden
The agency attracted widespread criticism after it used a local doctor in Pakistan to set up a hepatitis B vaccination program in Abbottabad in 2011 to obtain DNA samples from the occupants of a compound where it was suspected bin Laden was living, hoping to obtain samples from bin Laden or his children in order to confirm his presence. It is unknown whether any useful DNA was acquired from the program, but it was deemed not successful. The doctor was later arrested and sentenced to a lengthy prison term on allegedly unrelated charges.[196] Médecins Sans Frontières criticized the CIA for endangering and undermining trust in medical workers[197] and The New York Times reported that the CIA's action had increased resistance to vaccination programs in Pakistan.[198]
Failures in intelligence analysis
A major criticism is a failure to forestall the September 11 attacks. The 9/11 Commission Report identified failures in the IC as a whole. One problem, for example, was the FBI failing to "connect the dots" by sharing information among its decentralized field offices.
The report concluded that former DCI George Tenet failed to adequately prepare the agency to deal with the danger posed by al-Qaeda prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001.[199] The report was finished in June 2005 and was partially released to the public in an agreement with Congress, over the objections of current DCI General Michael Hayden. Hayden said its publication would "consume time and attention revisiting ground that is already well plowed."[200] Tenet disagreed with the report's conclusions, citing his planning efforts vis-à-vis al-Qaeda, particularly from 1999.[201] Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence, Carl W. Ford Jr. remarked, ""As long as we rate intelligence more for its volume than its quality, we will continue to turn out the $40 billion pile of crap we have become famous for." He further stated, "[The CIA is] broken. It's so broken that nobody wants to believe it."[202]
Abuses of CIA authority, 1970s–1990s
Conditions worsened in the mid-1970s, around the time of Watergate. A dominant feature of political life during that period were the attempts of Congress to assert oversight of the U.S. Presidency and the executive branch of the U.S. government. Revelations about past CIA activities, such as assassinations and attempted assassinations of foreign leaders (most notably Fidel Castro and Rafael Trujillo) and illegal domestic spying on U.S. citizens, provided the opportunities to increase Congressional oversight of U.S. intelligence operations.[150] CIA involvement in Contra cocaine trafficking in Nicaragua[203][204] and complicity in the actions of the death squads in El Salvador and Honduras also came to light.[205][206]
Hastening the CIA's fall from grace was the burglary of the Watergate headquarters of the Democratic Party by former CIA officers, and President Richard Nixon's subsequent attempt to use the CIA to impede the FBI's investigation of the burglary. In the famous "smoking gun" recording that led to President Nixon's resignation, Nixon ordered his chief of staff, H. R. Haldeman, to tell the CIA that further investigation of Watergate would "open the whole can of worms about the Bay of Pigs".[207][208] In this way Nixon and Haldeman ensured that the CIA's No. 1 and No. 2 ranking officials, Richard Helms and Vernon Walters, communicated to FBI Director L. Patrick Gray that the FBI should not follow the money trail from the burglars to the Committee to Re-elect the President, as it would uncover CIA informants in Mexico. The FBI initially agreed to this due to a long-standing agreement between the FBI and CIA not to uncover each other's sources of information, though within a couple of weeks the FBI demanded this request in writing, and when no such formal request came, the FBI resumed its investigation into the money trail. Nonetheless, when the smoking gun tapes were made public, damage to the public's perception of CIA's top officials, and thus to the CIA as a whole, could not be avoided.[209]
Repercussions from the Iran–Contra affair arms smuggling scandal included the creation of the Intelligence Authorization Act in 1991. It defined covert operations as secret missions in geopolitical areas where the U.S. is neither openly nor engaged. This also required an authorizing chain of command, including an official, presidential finding report and the informing of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, which, in emergencies, requires only "timely notification."
Iraq War
Seventy-two days after the 9/11 attacks, President Bush told Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to update the US plan for an invasion of Iraq, but not to tell anyone. Rumsfeld asked Bush if he could bring DCI Tenet into the loop, to which Bush agreed.[210]
The CIA had put out feelers to Iraq in the form of eight of their best officers in Kurdish territory in Northern Iraq. These officers hit a goldmine, unprecedented in the famously closed Hussein government. By December 2002, the CIA had close to a dozen functional networks in Iraq[210]:242 and would penetrate Iraq's SSO, tap the encrypted communications of the Deputy Prime Minister, and recruit the bodyguard of Hussein's son[which?] as an agent. As time passed, the CIA would become more and more frantic about the possibility of their networks being compromised. To the CIA, the invasion had to occur before the end of February 2003 if their sources inside Hussein's government were to survive. The rollup would happen as predicted, 37 CIA sources recognized by their Thuraya satellite telephones provided for them by the CIA.[210]:337
The case Colin Powell presented before the United Nations (purportedly proving an Iraqi WMD program) was inaccurate. DDCI John E. McLaughlin was part of a long discussion in the CIA about equivocation. McLaughlin, who would make, among others, the "slam dunk" presentation to the President, "felt that they had to dare to be wrong to be clearer in their judgments".[210]:197 The Al Qaeda connection, for instance, was from a single source, extracted through torture, and was later denied. Curveball was a known liar, and the sole source for the mobile chemical weapons factories.[212] A postmortem of the intelligence failures in the lead up to Iraq led by former DDCI Richard Kerr would conclude that the CIA had been a casualty of the Cold War, wiped out in a way "analogous to the effect of the meteor strikes on the dinosaurs."[213]
The opening days of the invasion of Iraq would see successes and defeats for the CIA. With its Iraq networks compromised, and its strategic and tactical information shallow, and often wrong, the intelligence side of the invasion itself would be a black eye for the agency. The CIA would see some success with its "Scorpion" paramilitary teams composed of CIA Special Activities Division agents, along with friendly Iraqi partisans. CIA SAD officers would also help the US 10th Special Forces.[210][214][215] The occupation of Iraq would be a low point in the history of the CIA. At the largest CIA station in the world, agents would rotate through 1–3-month tours. In Iraq, almost 500 transient agents would be trapped inside the Green Zone while Iraq station chiefs would rotate with only a little less frequency.[216]
2004, DNI takes over CIA top-level functions
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 created the office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), who took over some of the government and intelligence community (IC)-wide functions that had previously been the CIA's. The DNI manages the United States Intelligence Community and in so doing it manages the intelligence cycle. Among the functions that moved to the DNI were the preparation of estimates reflecting the consolidated opinion of the 16 IC agencies, and preparation of briefings for the president. On July 30, 2008, President Bush issued Executive Order 13470[217] amending Executive Order 12333 to strengthen the role of the DNI.[218]
Previously, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) oversaw the Intelligence Community, serving as the president's principal intelligence advisor, additionally serving as head of the CIA. The DCI's title now is "Director of the Central Intelligence Agency" (D/CIA), serving as head of the CIA.
Currently, the CIA reports to the Director of National Intelligence. Before the establishment of the DNI, the CIA reported to the President, with informational briefings to congressional committees. The National Security Advisor is a permanent member of the National Security Council, responsible for briefing the President with pertinent information collected by all U.S. intelligence agencies, including the National Security Agency, the Drug Enforcement Administration, etc. All 16 Intelligence Community agencies are under the authority of the Director of National Intelligence.
Operation Neptune Spear
On May 1, 2011, President Barack Obama announced that Osama bin Laden was killed earlier that day by "a small team of Americans" operating in Abbottabad, Pakistan, during a CIA operation.[219][220] The raid was executed from a CIA forward base in Afghanistan by elements of the U.S. Navy's Naval Special Warfare Development Group and CIA paramilitary operatives.[221]
It resulted in the acquisition of extensive intelligence on the future attack plans of al-Qaeda.[222][223][224]
The operation was a result of years of intelligence work that included the CIA's capture and interrogation of Khalid Sheik Mohammad, which led to the identity of a courier of bin Laden's,[225][226][227] the tracking of the courier to the compound by Special Activities Division paramilitary operatives and the establishing of a CIA safe house to provide critical tactical intelligence for the operation.[228][229][230]
Syrian Civil War
Under the aegis of operation Timber Sycamore and other clandestine activities, CIA operatives and U.S. special operations troops have trained and armed nearly 10,000 rebel fighters at a cost of $1 billion a year.[231] The CIA has been sending weapons to anti-government rebels in Syria since at least 2012.[232] These weapons have been reportedly falling into hands of extremists, such as al-Nusra Front and ISIL.[233][234][235] Around February 2017, the CIA was instructed to halt military aid to Syrian rebels (Free Syrian Army or FSA), which also included training, ammunition, guided missiles, and salaries. Sources state that the hold on aid was not related to the transitions from Obama's administration to Trump's, but rather due to issues faced by the FSA. Based on responses by rebel officials, they believe that the aid freeze is related to concerns that weapons and funds will fall into the hands of ISIL. Based on information obtained by Reuters, five FSA groups have confirmed that they received funding and military support from a source called "MOM operations room."[clarification needed] Several countries besides the U.S., including Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, had also contributed to the funding of the FSA.[citation needed] On April 6, 2017, Al-Jazeera reported that funding to the FSA was partially restored. Based on the information provided by two FSA sources, the new military operation room will receive its funds from the coalition "Friends of Syria." The coalition consists of members from the U.S, Turkey, Western Europe, and Gulf states, which previously supported the military operation known as MOM.[236]
It was reported in July 2017 that President Donald Trump had ordered a "phasing out" of the CIA's support for anti-Assad rebels.[237]
Reorganization
On March 6, 2015, the office of the D/CIA issued an unclassified edition of a statement by the Director, titled "Our Agency's Blueprint for the Future," as a press release for public consumption. The press release announced sweeping plans for the reorganization and reform of the CIA, which the Director believes will bring the CIA more in line with the agency doctrine called the 'Strategic Direction.' Among the key changes disclosed include the establishment of a new directorate, the Directorate of Digital Innovation, which is responsible for designing and crafting the digital technology to be used by the agency, to keep the CIA always ahead of its enemies. The Directorate of Digital Innovation will also train CIA staff in the use of this technology, to prepare the CIA for the future, and it will also use the technological revolution to deal with cyber-terrorism and other perceived threats. The new directorate will be the chief cyber-espionage arm of the agency going forward.[238]
Other changes which were announced include the formation of a Talent Development Center of Excellence, the enhancement and expansion of the CIA University and the creation of the office of the Chancellor to head the CIA University to consolidate and unify recruitment and training efforts. The office of the Executive Director will be empowered and expanded, and the secretarial offices serving the Executive Director will be streamlined. The restructuring of the entire Agency is to be revamped according to a new model whereby governance is modeled after the structure and hierarchy of corporations, said to increase the efficiency of workflow and to enable the Executive Director to manage day-to-day activity significantly. As well, another stated intention was to establish 'Mission Centers', each one to deal with a specific geographic region of the world, which will bring the full collaboration and joint efforts of the five Directorates together under one roof. While the Directorate heads will still retain ultimate authority over their respective Directorate, the Mission Centers will be led by an Assistant Director who will work with the capabilities and talents of all five Directorates on mission-specific goals for the parts of the world which they are given responsibility for.[238]
The unclassified version of the document ends with the announcement that the National Clandestine Service (NCS) will be reverting to its original Directorate name, the Directorate of Operations. The Directorate of Intelligence is also being renamed. It will now be the Directorate of Analysis.[238]
Drones
A new policy introduced by President Barack Obama removed the authority of the CIA to launch drone attacks and allowed these attacks only under Department of Defense command. This change was reversed by President Donald Trump, who authorized CIA drone strikes on suspected terrorists.[239]
Encryption devices sold through front company
For decades until 2018, the CIA secretly owned Crypto AG, a small Swiss company that made encryption devices, in association with West German intelligence. The company sold compromised encryption devices to over 120 countries, allowing Western intelligence to eavesdrop on communications that the users believed to be secure.[240][241]
Open source intelligence
Until the 2004 reorganization of the intelligence community, one of the "services of common concern" that the CIA provided was open source intelligence from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS).[242] FBIS, which had absorbed the Joint Publication Research Service, a military organization that translated documents,[243] moved into the National Open Source Enterprise under the Director of National Intelligence.
During the Reagan administration, Michael Sekora (assigned to the DIA), worked with agencies across the intelligence community, including the CIA, to develop and deploy a technology-based competitive strategy system called Project Socrates. Project Socrates was designed to utilize open source intelligence gathering almost exclusively. The technology-focused Socrates system supported such programs as the Strategic Defense Initiative in addition to private sector projects.[244][245]
As part of its mandate to gather intelligence, the CIA is looking increasingly online for information, and has become a major consumer of social media. "We're looking at YouTube, which carries some unique and honest-to-goodness intelligence," said Doug Naquin, director of the DNI Open Source Center (OSC) at CIA headquarters. "We're looking at chat rooms and things that didn't exist five years ago, and trying to stay ahead."[246] CIA launched a Twitter account in June 2014.[247]
CIA also launched its own .onion website to collect anonymous feedback.[248]
Outsourcing and privatization
Many of the duties and functions of Intelligence Community activities, not the CIA alone, are being outsourced and privatized. Mike McConnell, former Director of National Intelligence, was about to publicize an investigation report of outsourcing by U.S. intelligence agencies, as required by Congress.[249] However, this report was then classified.[250][251] Hillhouse speculates that this report includes requirements for the CIA to report:[250][252]
- different standards for government employees and contractors;
- contractors providing similar services to government workers;
- analysis of costs of contractors vs. employees;
- an assessment of the appropriateness of outsourced activities;
- an estimate of the number of contracts and contractors;
- comparison of compensation for contractors and government employees;
- attrition analysis of government employees;
- descriptions of positions to be converted back to the employee model;
- an evaluation of accountability mechanisms;
- an evaluation of procedures for "conducting oversight of contractors to ensure identification and prosecution of criminal violations, financial waste, fraud, or other abuses committed by contractors or contract personnel"; and
- an "identification of best practices of accountability mechanisms within service contracts."
According to investigative journalist Tim Shorrock:
...what we have today with the intelligence business is something far more systemic: senior officials leaving their national security and counterterrorism jobs for positions where they essentially perform the same jobs they once held at the CIA, the NSA, and other agencies – but for double or triple the salary and profit. It's a privatization of the highest order, in which our collective memory and experience in intelligence – our crown jewels of spying, so to speak – are owned by corporate America. There is essentially no government oversight of this private sector at the heart of our intelligence empire. And the lines between public and private have become so blurred as to be nonexistent.[253][254]
Congress had required an outsourcing report by March 30, 2008.[252]
The Director of National Intelligence has been granted the authority to increase the number of positions (FTEs) on elements in the Intelligence Community by up to 10% should there be a determination that activities performed by a contractor should be done by a U.S. government employee."[252]
The problem is two-fold. Part of the problem, according to Author Tim Weiner, is that political appointees designated by recent presidential administrations have sometimes been under-qualified or over-zealous politically. Large scale purges have taken place in the upper echelons of the CIA, and when those talented individuals are pushed out the door they have frequently gone on to found new independent intelligence companies which can suck up CIA talent.[115] Another part of the contracting problem comes from Congressional restrictions on the number of employees within the IC. According to Hillhouse, this resulted in 70% of the de facto workforce of the CIA's National Clandestine Service being made up of contractors. "After years of contributing to the increasing reliance upon contractors, Congress is now providing a framework for the conversion of contractors into federal government employees – more or less."[252] The number of independent contractors hired by the Federal government across the intelligence community has skyrocketed. So, not only does the CIA have trouble hiring, but those hires will frequently leave their permanent employ for shorter term contract gigs which have much higher pay and allow for more career mobility.[115]
As with most government agencies, building equipment often is contracted. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), responsible for the development and operation of airborne and spaceborne sensors, long was a joint operation of the CIA and the United States Department of Defense. The NRO had been significantly involved in the design of such sensors, but the NRO, then under DCI authority, contracted more of the design that had been their tradition, and to a contractor without extensive reconnaissance experience, Boeing. The next-generation satellite Future Imagery Architecture project "how does heaven look," which missed objectives after $4 billion in cost overruns, was the result of this contract.[255][256]
Some of the cost problems associated with intelligence come from one agency, or even a group within an agency, not accepting the compartmented security practices for individual projects, requiring expensive duplication.[257]
Controversies
Throughout its history, the CIA has been the subject of many controversies, both at home and abroad.
In fiction
Fictional depictions of the CIA exist in many books, films and video games. Some fiction draws, at least in parts, on actual historical events, while other works are entirely fictional. The television series Chuck (2007), was based solely on a man who accidentally sees secret CIA encryptions and eventually becomes an asset/liability, and later on an agent in the agency. Films include Charlie Wilson's War (2007), based on the story of U.S. Congressman Charlie Wilson and CIA operative Gust Avrakotos, who supported the Afghan mujahideen, and The Good Shepherd (2006), a fictional spy film produced and directed by Robert De Niro based loosely on the development of counter-intelligence in the CIA. The fictional character Jack Ryan in Tom Clancy's books is a CIA analyst.[258] Graham Greene's The Quiet American is about a CIA agent operating in Southeast Asia.[259] Fictional depictions of the CIA are also used in video games, such as Tom Clancy's Splinter Cell, Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 and Call of Duty: Black Ops.
See also
- Abu Omar case
- Blue sky memo
- CIA's relationship with the United States Military
- Classified information in the United States
- Freedom of Information Act (United States)
- Intellipedia
- Kryptos
- National Intelligence Board
- Operation Peter Pan
- Reagan Doctrine
- Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations
- U.S. Army and CIA interrogation manuals
- United States and state-sponsored terrorism
- United States Department of Homeland Security
- United States Intelligence Community
- Vault 7
- The World Factbook, published by the CIA
Notes
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- ^ Domínguez, Jorge I. (April 2000). "The @#$%& Missile Crisis" (PDF). Diplomatic History. Oxford/Malden: Blackwell Publishers/Oxford University Press. 24 (2): 305–316. doi:10.1111/0145-2096.00214. Archived (PDF) from the original on September 7, 2020. Retrieved September 6, 2019.
On the afternoon of 16 October... Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy convened in his office a meeting on Operation Mongoose, the code name for a U.S. policy of sabotage and related covert operation aimed at Cuba... The Kennedy administration returned to its policy of sponsoring terrorism against Cuba as the confrontation with the Soviet Union lessened... Only once in these nearly thousand pages of documentation did a U.S. official raise something that resembled a faint moral objection to U.S.-government sponsored terrorism.
- ^ a b Schoultz, Lars (2009). "State Sponsored Terrorism". That infernal little Cuban republic : the United States and the Cuban Revolution. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. pp. 170–211. ISBN 9780807888605. Retrieved February 2, 2020.
What more could be done? How about a program of sabotage focused on blowing up "such targets as refineries, power plants, micro wave stations, radio and TV installations, strategic highway bridges and railroad facilities, military and naval installations and equipment, certain industrial plants and sugar refineries." The CIA proposed just that approach a month after the Bay of Pigs, and the State Department endorsed the proposal... In early November, six months after the Bay of Pigs, JFK authorized the CIA's "Program of Covert Action", now dubbed Operation Mongoose, and named Lansdale its chief of operations. A few days later, President Kennedy told a Seattle audience, "We cannot, as a free nation, compete with our adversaries in tactics of terror, assassination, false promises, counterfeit mobs and crises." Perhaps – but the Mongoose decision indicated that he was willing to try.
- ^ Prados, John; Jimenez-Bacardi, Arturo, eds. (October 3, 2019). Kennedy and Cuba: Operation Mongoose. National Security Archive (Report). Washington, D.C.: The George Washington University. Archived from the original on November 2, 2019. Retrieved April 3, 2020.
The memorandum showed no concern for international law or the unspoken nature of these operations as terrorist attacks.
- ^ Lansdale, Edward (January 18, 1962). Smith, Louis J. (ed.). Program Review by the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose. Foreign Relations of the United States (Report). 1961–1963. Volume X, Cuba. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. Retrieved February 19, 2020.
|volume=has extra text (help) - ^ a b Franklin, Jane (2016). Cuba and the U.S. empire : a chronological history. New York: New York University Press. pp. 45–63, 388–392, et passim. ISBN 9781583676059. Retrieved February 2, 2020.
- ^ a b Erlich, Reese (2008). Dateline Havana : the real story of U.S. policy and the future of Cuba. Abingdon/New York: Routledge. pp. 26–29. ISBN 9781317261605. Retrieved February 2, 2020.
Officially, the United States favored only peaceful means to pressure Cuba. In reality, U.S. leaders also used violent, terrorist tactics... Operation Mongoose began in November 1961... U.S. operatives attacked civilian targets, including sugar refineries, saw mills, and molasses storage tanks. Some 400 CIA officers worked on the project in Washington and Miami... Operation Mongoose and various other terrorist operations caused property damage and injured and killed Cubans. But they failed to achieve their goal of regime change.
- ^ Brenner, Philip (2002). "Turning History on its Head". National Security Archive. Washington, D.C.: The George Washington University. Archived from the original on August 24, 2017. Retrieved January 2, 2020.
..in October 1962 the United States was waging a war against Cuba that involved several assassination attempts against the Cuban leader, terrorist acts against Cuban civilians, and sabotage of Cuban factories.
- ^ Stepick, Alex; Stepick, Carol Dutton (2002). "Power and Identity". In Suárez-Orozco, Marcelo M.; Páez, Mariela M. (eds.). Latinos: Remaking America. Berkeley/London: University of California Press, Harvard University Center for Latin American Studies. pp. 75–81. ISBN 978-0520258273. Retrieved February 2, 2020.
Through the 1960s, the private University of Miami had the largest Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) station in the world, outside of the organization's headquarters in Virginia. With perhaps as many as twelve thousand Cubans in Miami on its payroll at one point in the early 1960s, the CIA was one of the largest employers in the state of Florida. It supported what was described as the third largest navy in the world and over fifty front businesses: CIA boat shops, gun shops, travel agencies, detective agencies, and real estate agencies
- ^ Bohning, Don (2005). The Castro obsession : U.S. covert operations against Cuba, 1959-1965 (1st ed.). Washington, D.C.: University of Nebraska Press/Potomac Books. pp. 1, 84. ISBN 9781574886757. Retrieved February 2, 2020.
By the end of 1962 the CIA station at an abandoned Navy air facility south of Miami had become the largest in the world outside its Langley, Virginia headquarters... Eventually some four hundred clandestine service officers toiled there... Additional CIA officers worked the Cuba account at Langley and elsewhere.
- ^ Miller, Nicola (2002). "The Real Gap in the Cuban Missile Crisis: The Post-Cold-War Historiography and Continued Omission of Cuba". In Carter, Dale; Clifton, Robin (eds.). War and Cold War in American foreign policy, 1942–62. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 211–237. ISBN 9781403913852. Retrieved February 2, 2020.
- ^ a b Brenner, Philip (March 1990). "Cuba and the Missile Crisis". Journal of Latin American Studies. Cambridge University Press. 22 (1–2): 115–142. doi:10.1017/S0022216X00015133. Archived (PDF) from the original on September 7, 2020. Retrieved September 2, 2019.
While Operation Mongoose was discontinued early in 1963, terrorist actions were reauthorised by the president. In October 1963, 13 major CIA actions against Cuba were approved for the next two months alone, including the sabotage of an electric power plant, a sugar mill and an oil refinery. Authorised CIA raids continued at least until 1965.
- ^ Garthoff, Raymond (2011). Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. p. 144. ISBN 9780815717393. Retrieved February 2, 2020.
One of Nixon's first acts in office in 1969 was to direct the CIA to intensify covert operations against Cuba
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Among the documents posted is an annotated list of four volumes of still-secret records on Posada's career with the CIA, his acts of violence, and his suspected involvement in the bombing of Cubana flight 455 on October 6, 1976, which took the lives of all 73 people on board, many of them teenagers.
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"Nonfiction Book Review: The Spy Who Saved the World: How a Soviet Colonel Changed the Course of the Cold War by Jerrold L. Schecter, Author, Peter S. Deriabin, With Scribner Book Company $25 (0p) ISBN 978-0-684-19068-6". Publishers Weekly. Retrieved May 22, 2021. - ^ Gibbs, David N. (1995). "Let Us Forget Unpleasant Memories: The US State Department's Analysis of the Congo Crisis". Journal of Modern African Studies. 33 (1): 175–180. doi:10.1017/s0022278x0002098x. JSTOR 161559.
There seems little doubt that the Congo was targeted by one of the most extensive covert operations in the history of the CIA, and its significance has been noted repeatedly by former officers, as well as by scholars. Americans in both the CIA station and the embassy directly intervened in Congolese affairs, bribing parliamentarians, setting up select units of the military, and promoting the career of General Mobutu. In addition to any assassination plots, it is well documented that the United States played an essential role in two efforts to overthrow Lumumba, both in September 1960....
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References
- Immerman, Richard H. (1982). The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention. University of Texas Press. ISBN 978-0-292-71083-2.
- Weiner, Tim (2007). Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. New York: Doubleday. ISBN 978-0-385-51445-3. OCLC 82367780.
Further reading
| Library resources about Central Intelligence Agency |
- Agee, Philip (1975). Inside the Company: CIA Diary. Harmondsworth: Penguin. ISBN 0-140-04007-2.
- Aldrich, Richard J. (2001). The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence. London: John Murray. ISBN 0-7195-5423-3. OCLC 46513534.
- Andrew, Christopher (1996). For the President's Eyes Only. HarperCollins. ISBN 0-00-638071-9.
- Baer, Robert (2003). Sleeping with the Devil: How Washington Sold Our Soul for Saudi Crude. Crown. ISBN 1-4000-5021-9.
- Bearden, Milton; James Risen (2003). The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown With the KGB. Random House. ISBN 0-679-46309-7.
- Coll, Steve (2004). Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. Penguin Group. ISBN 978-1594200076.
- Dujmovic, Nicholas, "Drastic Actions Short of War: The Origins and Application of CIA's Covert Paramilitary Function in the Early Cold War," Journal of Military History, 76 (July 2012), 775–808
- Gibson, Bryan R. (2015). Sold Out? US Foreign Policy, Iraq, the Kurds, and the Cold War. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-1-137-48711-7.
- Hilsman, Roger. To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (1967) pp 63–88.
- Jacobsen, Annie (2019). Surprise, Kill, Vanish, The Secret History of CIA Paramilitary Armies, Operators, and Assassins. Little, Brown and Company. ISBN 978-0316441438.
- Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri. Cloak and Dollar: A History of American Secret Intelligence (Yale University Press, 2002).
- Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri. The CIA and American Democracy (Yale University Press, 1989).
- Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri. American Espionage: From Secret Service to CIA (Free Press, 1977).
- Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri. "Antecedents and Memory as Factors in the Creation of the CIA", Diplomatic History, 40/1 (January 2016): 140-54.
- Johnson, Loch K. (1991). America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-505490-3.
- Jones, Ishmael (2010). The Human Factor: Inside the CIA's Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture. Encounter Books. ISBN 978-1-59403-223-3.
- Jones, Milo; Silberzahn, Philippe (2013). Constructing Cassandra, Reframing Intelligence Failure at the CIA, 1947–2001. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0804793360.
- Kessler, Ronald (2003). The CIA at War: Inside the Secret Campaign Against Terror. St. Martin's Press. ISBN 0-312-31932-0.
- Kinzer, Stephen (2003). All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 978-0470185490.
- Marchetti, Victor; John D. Marks (1974). The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. Knopf. ISBN 0-394-48239-5.
- McCoy, Alfred W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. Harper Colophon. ISBN 978-0-06-090328-2.
- McCoy, Alfred W. (2006). A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on Terror. New York: Owl Books (Henry Holt & Co.). ISBN 0-8050-8248-4. OCLC 78821099.
- Mahle, Melissa Boyle (2004). Denial and Deception: An Insider's View of the CIA from Iran-Contra to 9/11. Nation Books. ISBN 1-56025-649-4.
- Powers, Thomas (1979). The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms & the CIA. Alfred A. Knopf. ISBN 978-0394507774.
- Prados, John. Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II Through the Persian Gulf War (1996)
- Ranelagh, John. CIA: A History (1992) very favorable review
- Rositzke, Harry (1977). The CIA's Secret Operations. Reader's Digest Press. ISBN 0-88349-116-8.
- Ruth, Steven (2011). My Twenty Years as a CIA Officer: It's All About The Mission. Charleston, SC: CreateSpace. ISBN 978-1-4565-7170-2.
- Sheymov, Victor (1993). Tower of Secrets. U.S. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-55750-764-8.
- Smith, W. Thomas, Jr. (2003). Encyclopedia of the Central Intelligence Agency. Facts on File. ISBN 0-8160-4667-0.
- Turner, Stansfield (2006). Burn Before Reading: Presidents, CIA Directors, and Secret Intelligence. Hyperion. ISBN 0-7868-8666-8.
- Wallace, Robert; Melton, H. Keith; Schlesinger, Henry R. (2008). Spycraft: The Secret History of the CIA's Spytechs, from Communism to al-Qaeda. New York: Dutton. ISBN 978-0-525-94980-0. OCLC 18255288.
- Wise, David; Ross, Thomas B. (1964). The Invisible Government. Random House. ISBN 978-0394430775.
External links
- Official website
- Central Intelligence Agency at the Wayback Machine (archive index)
- CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room
- Landscapes of Secrecy: The CIA in History, Fiction and Memory (2011)
- Works by or about Central Intelligence Agency at Internet Archive
- Works by Central Intelligence Agency at LibriVox (public domain audiobooks)
- Central Intelligence Collection at Internet Archive
| General | |
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| National libraries | |
| Scientific databases | |
| Other | |
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